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THE "DOMINANT POSITION" DOCTRINE 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S RESPONSE 
TO THE BRITISH AIRWAYS/AMERICAN 
AIRLINES ALLIANCE 
INTRODUCTION 
Companies are increasingly adopting global strategies as a means 
of marketing their products and services. l One such global strategy 
that has recently gained momentum in the airline industry is the 
"strategic alliance. ''2 In 1998 alone, the number of alliances between 
both national and international carriers rose by 38%, to a total of 
502.3 Previously there were only a few limited alliances and the impact 
on competition was correspondingly limited.4 Recently, however, 
tightly knit alliances have become the rule rather than the exception 
and a very large share of the North Atlantic air travel market "is being 
or will be served by alliances."5 The dominant feature of these alli-
ances is code-sharing-the use of an airline's two-letter designator on 
a partner's flight, producing the equivalent of an online connection 
and, as a result, a more favorable Computer Reservation System 
(CRS) display.6 Airline alliances, however, are often very similar to 
mergers in that the companies involved operate on the market like 
one entity, eliminating all competition between them.7 Accordingly, 
these airline alliances raise important competition issues and gain the 
attention of antitrust authorities.s 
1 See Commissioner Karel Van Miert, Competition PoliC)1 in the Air Transport Sector (Mar. 9, 
1998) (,isited Oct. 12, 1998) <http://europa.eu.illt/comm/dg04/speech/eight/eu/ 
sp98035.htm> [hereinafter Van Miert Speech]. 
2 Joan M. Feldman, Alliances: Are ne Making Money let?, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Oct. 1, 
1995, at 24, available in 1995 WL 8100102. 
3 See Come Fly With Me, ECONOMIST, June 20, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
MAGS File. 
4 See Van Mierl Speech, supra note 1. 
5Id. 
6 See Feldman, supra note 2, at 24. 
7 See Van Mierl Speech, supra note 1. The airlines decide to cooperate ou such matters as 
fares, frequencies, schedules, and relationships with trayel agents. See id. 
S See id.; Carole A Shifrin & Pierre Sparaco, Ame1ican, BA Move Close1' to Partnership 
European Commission Seeks to Preserve Competition in Setting Conditions for Mega-Alliances, Av. 
WK. & SPACE TECH.,July 13,1998, available in 1998 WL 8144678. 
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Internationally, the most noteworthy airline alliance is between 
British Airways (BA) and American Airlines (AA), which was first pro-
posed in 1996.9 Since then, European Union (EU) competition 
authorities have been looking into the BAI AA alliance and several 
other notable international airline alliances.l° In July of 1998, the EU 
competition authorities announced a preliminary position on the 
BAI AA alliance. ll As the trend towards international airline alliances 
is a relatively recent development in the airline industry, the July 
opinion was the first time the EU competition authorities ruled on 
this issue.l2 
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the competition issues 
raised by the BAI AA alliance and the response of the EU competition 
authorities to those issues. This analysis is done within the context of 
the relevant EU competition laws-specifically, the "dominant posi-
tion" doctrine. Part I provides a general background on the relevant 
EU competition authorities and the relevant law as delineated in 
treaty provisions, regulations, and case law. Part II discusses the back-
ground of the BAI AA alliance and the competition issues raised by 
the alliance within the context of the competition law discussed in 
Part I. This section concludes by summarizing the proposed condi-
tions for approval of the alliance. Part III analyzes the competition 
issues raised by the BAI AA alliance and critiques the conditions for 
approval delineated by the EU competition authorities. Finally, this 
Note concludes that the EU needs to expand its ability to regulate air 
travel between EU Member states and non-Member States. 
9 See COlnR Fly With Me, supra note 3, at 69. 
10 See Airline Alliances: Commission Announces Conditions for Take Off, EU Focus, July 16, 
1998, at 2 [hereinafter Airline Alliances]. Other notable alliances that have come under 
investigation include: the "Stal" Alliance," which combines United Airlines, Lufthansa 
German Airlines, Air Canada, Scandinavian Airlines System, Thai Airways International, 
and Vatig Brazilian Airlines, the alliance between Northwest and KLM Royal Dutch Air-
lines, and the alliance among Sabena, Austrian Airlines, Swissair and Delta. See id.; see also 
Carole A. Shiflin, Proliferating Partnerships FacR Increased Scm tiny, Ay. WK. & SPACE TECH., 
Nov. 17, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,l\1AGS File. 
11 See Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance between British Airways and 
American Airlines, 1998 OJ. (C 239) 10 [hereinafter Commission Notice]; Airline Alliances, 
supra note 10, at 2. The final decision of the EU competition authorities is expected to 
come some time dming the Fall of 1999. This final decision was not yet available as of the 
final re\"ision of this Note for publication. 
12 See Airline Alliances, supra note 10, at 2. 
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I. OVERVIEW OF ED COMPETITION AUTHORITIES AND SUMMARY OF 
RELEVANT COMPETITION LAw 
A. Overview of Enforcement/Regulatory Authorities and their Role inEU 
Competition Law 
73 
The primary institutions that set and enforce the ED competition 
policies are as follows: the Council of Ministers (Council), the Com-
mission of the European Communities (Con?-mission), the Court of 
First Instance (CFI), and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) .13 The 
Council is the EU's legislative body and can enact subordinate legisla-
tion on proposal from the Commission.14 Essentially, it is the EU's 
main decision-making body.15 The Commission is the executive arm 
of the ED and is composed of 20 members.16 Each Commission mem-
ber is responsible for one or more specific policy areas.17 Members are 
served by a secretariat, divided into Directorates General (DGS).IB DG 
IV is the Directorate General for competition.19 The Commission en-
forces the EU competition rules.20 The Commission's enforcement 
decisions can be appealed to the ED courts.21 
The CFI is usually the first court to hear competition-related 
cases and its decisions can be appealed to the ECJ.22 The purpose of 
the ECl is to ensure that the law, as delineated in treaties as well as 
13 See Mercer H. Harz, Comment, Dominance and Dut)1 in the European Union: A Look 
Through Microsoft Windows at the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 11 EMORY INT'L L. RE,·. 189, 192 
(1997). 
14 See VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LA\\' AND 
PRACTICE 17 (6th ed. 1997). 
15 See NICHOLAS MOUSSIS, ACCESS TO EUROPEAN UNION, LAw, ECONOMICS, POLICIES 59 
(7th ed. 1997). 
16 See KORAH, supra note 14, at 18. 
17 See id. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. From 1993 to 1999, DG IV was headed by Karel Van Miert. See William Echik-
son, lim Miert is Shaking Up the EU with His Broad Antitrust Powers, Bus. WK., Feb. 2, 1998, at 
16, available in LEXlS, News libral'Y, MAGS File. Mr. Van Miert is a Belgian in his mid-
fifties who has been referred to as the EU's "antitrust czar." See id. During his term as head 
of DG IV, Van Miert expanded the Commission's power to investigate mergers and joint 
ventures and simplified the review process for mergers and acquisitions. See id. He is de-
sClibed as "noisy and colorful" and has been accused by Clitics of blocking deals more for 
political reasons than because they would hamper competition. Id. 
20 See KORAH, supra note 14, at 21. 
21 See Harz, supra note 13, at 192. 
22 See id. at 193. The Court of First Instance was created by COllncil Dec. 
88/591/ECSC, 1988 OJ. (L 319) 1, EEC and EURATOM. and began operation in October 
1989. See KORAH, supra note 14, at 19 n.29. 
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legal acts and decisions of the Council and the Commission, is ob-
served and applied in a uniform manner.23 The ECJ has the final say 
in interpreting matters ofEU law.24 
B. Overview of Relevant Treaty Provisions and Regulations 
The Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) 
delineates the overall framework for EU competition policy.25 For 
purposes of this Note, the most relevant competition provisions of the 
EC Treaty are: Article 2, Article 3(1) (g), and Articles 81-85.26 In addi-
tion, Regulation 3975/87 grants the Commission its ordinary investi-
gative powers in the air transport industry.27 
Article 2 outlines several tasks of the EU.28 The task most related 
to preserving competition is the task of promoting "throughout the 
23 See MOUSSIS, supra note 15, at 6l. 
24 See Harz, supra note 13, at 192. 
25 See CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY, 371.L.M. 79 (Jan. 1998), in effect since July 1, 1999 [hereinafter EC TREATY]. The 
EC Treaty was amended by the TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EURO-
PEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN 
RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 OJ. (C 340) 1, in effect since July 1, 1999 [hereinafter 
Treaty of Amsterdam]. The Treaty of Amsterdam reconfigured some of the nmnbering 
system in the EC Treaty. The Articles of the EC Treaty discussed in this Note that were 
affected by the new numbering system, and their fonner numbers, are as follows: Articles 
81 (formerly 85),82 (formerly 86),83 (formerly 87),84 (formerly 88),85 (formerly 89), 
and 249 (formerly 189). Articles 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty, which are also discussed in this 
Note, were not affected by the reconfigured numbering system. Because the Treaty of Am-
sterdam amendmelits only recently went into effect on July 1, 1999, and because the 
sources used in this note-articles, books, ECJ cases-generally predate July 1, 1999, these 
sources use the former EC Treaty numbers for any Articles of the EC Treaty that they ref-
erence. For a version of the EC Treaty prior to the amendments and new numbering con-
figurations made by the Tl'eaty of Amsterdam, see TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 OJ. (C 224) 1, [1992]1 C.M.L.R 573 (1992). 
26 See EC TREATY, supra note 25, arts. 2, 3 and 81-85 (formerly articles 85-89). 
27 See Council Regulation 3975/87 (laying down the pl'Ocedure for the application of 
the rules on competition to undertakings in the air transport sector) 1987 OJ. (L 374) 1, 
as amended, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 18 [hereinafter Regulation 3975/87]. 
28 See EC TREATY, supra note 25, art. 2. The full text of Article 2 reads as follows: 
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and 
an economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or 
activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4, to pl'Omote thl'Oughout the ComnlU-
nity a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activi-
ties, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality between 
men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of 
competitiveness and convergence of economic perfonnance, a high level of 
protection and impl'Ovement of the quality of the envil'Onment, the raising of 
the standard of lidng and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion 
and solidarity among Member States. 
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Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of 
economic activities."29 Article 3(1) lists 21 activities of the Community 
which shall be carried out for the purpose of achieving the aims set 
out in Article 2.30 Article 3(1) (g), which includes the establishment of 
"a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not dis-
torted," embodies the most relevant activity for competition policy.31 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty outline the primary frame-
work for the regulation of competition in the EU.32 Article 81 gener-
ally prohibits actions by undertakings33 "which may affect trade be-
tween Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the com-
mon market;" it then lists several actions in particular.34 Article 82 out-
lines the dominant position doctrine.35 It prohibits any abuse of a 
dominant position within the EU by any undertaking occupying a 
dominant position to the extent that the abuse "may affect trade be-
tween Member States."36 Under Article 82, four activities in particular 
[d. 
29 [d. 
30 See id. art. 3(1). 
31 [d. art. 3(1)(g). 
32 See EC TREATY, supra note 25, arts. 81 and 82; Scott Kimpel, Antitrust Considerations 
in International Airline Alliances, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 475, 497 (1997). 
33 The term "undertaking" in the EU competition laws discussed in this Note means an 
entity such as a finn, corporation, company, or a group of companies, etc. See KORAH, supra 
note 14, at 338. 
[d. 
M EC ThEATY, supra note 25, art. 81(1). The full text of Article 81(1) reads as follows: 
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: 
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertak-
ings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States 
and which have as their object or effect the pre\'ention, restriction or distor-
tion of competition within the common market, and in particular those 
which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix pUl"chase or selling p1ices or any other trading 
conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, mal'kets, teclmical de\"elopment, or in-
vestment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trad-
ing parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disad\"antage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
55 See id. art. 82. 
36 [d. The full text of Article 82 is as follows: 
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constitute an abuse of a dominant position.37 Briefly stated, these ac-
tivities include price discrimination, production or technical devel-
opment limitations, application of "dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions," and tying arrangements.38 
This list of abusive practices, however, is not meant as an "exhaus-
tive" or exclusive list of conduct that may constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position.39 The ECl has stated that no exemption can be 
granted for abuse of a dominant position under Article 82 and that 
the prohibition outlined in Article 82 is "fully applicable to the whole 
of the air transport sector"-that is, flights between Member as well as 
non-Member States.40 The prohibitions in Articles 81 and 82 should 
be interpreted and applied in light of the goals of Articles 2 and 
3(1 )(g) of the EC Treaty discussed above.41 Articles 81 and 82 are not 
to be viewed in a mutually exclusive, or "contradictory" sense, as they 
are both intended to achieve the same goa1.42 With respect to both 
Articles 81 and 82, ED authorities have jurisdiction over the activities 
[d. 
Any abuse by one Ol' more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial pan of it shall be prohibited as incom-
patible with the common market insofar as it may affect trade between Mem-
ber States. Such abuse may, in particulal; consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or 
other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the preju-
dice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
u'ading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
connnercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such conU'acts. 
37 See EC TREATY, supra note 25, art. 82. 
38 [d. 
39 Case 6/72, Europemballange COlporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v. 
Commission, 1973 E.C.R 215, [1973] Part 68 C.M.L.R 199, 224 (1973) [hereinafter Conti-
nental Can]. Please note that all ECj pinpoint cites here and following al'e made to the 
C.M.L.R 
.j() Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Fliigreisen and Silver Line Reisebiiro GmbH v. Zentrale 
zur Bekiimpfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV, 1989 E.C.R 803, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R 102, 134 
(1989) [hereinafter Ahmed]. 
41 See Case 85/76, Hoffrnann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R 461, 
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R 211, 299 (1979) [hereinafter Hoffmann-La Roche]. 
42 See Continental Can, [1973] Part 68 C.M.L.R at 224. 
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of firms as long as the conduct of these firms occurs in or will have an 
effect on the EU.43 
Article 83 of the EC Treaty empowers the Council, on proposal 
from the Commission, to "adopt any appropriate regulations or direc-
tives44 to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 81 and 82. "45 
Article 84 of the EC Treaty enables Member States to rule on the ad-
missibility of competition practices with respect to Articles 81 and 82 
of the EC Treaty.46 Article 85 of the EC Treaty empowers the Commis-
sion to "ensure the application of the principles laid down in Articles 
81 and 82."47 
Investigation of international airline alliances must be done un-
der Article 85 of the EC Treaty because Regulation 3975/87, which 
gives the Commission its ordinary investigative powers in the air 
transport industry, is not applicable to flights between EU Member 
States and non-Member States.48 Regulation 3975/87 grants the 
Commission the power to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty to 
intra-community routes only.49 Therefore, with respect to interna-
tional airline alliances, the Commission must take action against prac-
tices it feels may be restrictive on routes between the EU and non-
Member States only under Article 85 of the EC Treaty.5o Article 85 al-
lows the Commission to "introduce monitoring provisions in the ab-
43 See id. at 217; Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continental 
BVv. Commission, 1978 E.C.R 207, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R 429, 497 (1978)[hereinafter United 
Brands]. 
44 Article 249 (formerly Article 189) of the EC Treaty provides five forms of legal acts 
which can be adopted by the Council and the Commission: 1) Regulation; 2) Directive; 3) 
Decision; 4) Recommendations; and 5) Opinions. A Regulation "has a general scope, is 
binding in all its elements and is directly applicable in each Member State." A Directive 
"binds any Member State to which it is addressed with regard to the result to be achieved, 
while leaving the national authorities jurisdiction as to the form and methods used." A 
Decision "is binding on the addressees it indicates, who may be one, several, or even all the 
Member States or one or more natural or legal persons." A Recommendation "suggests a 
certain line of conduct." An Opinion assesses "a CUlTent situation or certain facts in the 
Community or the Member States." EC ThEATY, supra note 25, art. 249; see also Moussls, 
supra note 15, at 43-44. 
45 EC ThEATY, supra note 25, art. 83. 
46 See id. art. 84. 
47 Id. art. 85. 
48 See Regulation 3975/87, supra note 27; European Commission, XXVIlth Report on 
Competition Policy, (1997) (Published in conjunction with the General Report on the Activities 
of the European Union-1997) (visited Oct. 12, 1998) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/ 
publici en/broch97.pdf> [hereinafter Report on Competition Policy]. 
49 See id. 
50 See EC TREATY, supra note 25, art. 85; Ahmed, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R at 131; RepOl1: 011 
Competition Policy, supra note 48, at 32. 
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sence of any specific implementing regulation. "51 While the recent 
wave of international airline alliances prompted the Commission to 
adopt a May 1997 memorandum containing a proposal for the exten-
sion of the scope of Regulation 3975/87 to include routes between 
EU airports and airports in non-Member States, to date that extension 
has not been made.52 Accordingly, international airline alliances, such 
as the one between BA and AA, continue to be monitored only under 
Article 85 ofthe EC Treaty.53 
C. EC] Case Law on Article 82-Determination of Existence of a Dominant 
Position and "When an Abuse Occurs 
To fully understand the idea of a dominant position and its 
abuse, as discussed in Article 82 of the EC Treaty, the idea of a domi-
nant position and its abuse must be viewed in the context of its appli-
cation and definition in EC] case law. Therefore, the discussion that 
follows will provide a case law context in which to understand the ap-
plication of Article 82 with respect to the case law development of the 
following three issues: 1) What constitutes a dominant position?; 2) 
What factors are relevant in assessing the existence of a dominant po-
sition?; and 3) What type of conduct will be deemed an abuse of a 
dominant position? 
1. What Constitutes a Dominant Position? 
The ECl has determined that the "dominant position" referred 
to in Article 82 describes "a position of economic strength enjoyed by 
an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition 
[from] being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its com-
petitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers. "54 The primary 
feature of a dominant position is an undertaking's ability to take ac-
tions without having to consider its competitors' undertakings in the 
market with respect to its market strategy and without "suffering any 
51 Report on Competition Policy, supra note 48, at 32 .. 
52 See id. 
53 See id.; EC ThEATY, supra note 25, mt. 85. 
54 United Brands, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R at 486-87; Hoffmann-La Roche, [1979] 3 
C.M.L.R at 274. Since United Brands, the ECJ has defmed a "dominant position" in this 
mmmer in all its judgments dealing with Article 82. See KORAn, supra note 14, at 77. In the 
Oliginal text of all of the cases discussed in this section, the court was referring to Article 
86, the former number for what is now numbered Article 82. 
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detrimental effects from such [independent] behavior. "55 A dominant 
position does not mean that an undertaking deemed to be in a domi-
nant position has no competitors; it simply means that an undertak-
ing is in a position to have an "appreciable influence on the condi-
tions" under which conduct in the relevant market will develop and to 
act largely in disregard of its competition "so long as such conduct 
does not operate to its detriment. "56 It is not illegal for an undertak-
ing to have a dominant position; however, where a firm is found to be 
in a dominant position it "has a special responsibility not to allow its 
conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the Common 
Market."57 
2. What Factors Are Relevant in Assessing the Existence of a 
Dominant Position? 
According to the ECl, there are two primary factors involved in 
assessing the existence of a dominant position.58 The first factor is a 
determination of the relevant market and the competitive conditions 
of supply and demand and interchangeability of products in that 
market.59 This determination allows for, and must include, an analysis 
of the totality and interchangeability of products in the relevant mar-
ket.60 The second factor is the relationship between the market shares 
of undertakings in the relevant market.61 This factor allows for a de-
termination of a particular undertaking's competitive strength both 
in general and with respect to its next largest competitor.62 
Many of the ECJ decisions involving Article 82 demonstrate that 
the ECl places a tremendous amount of importance on the existence 
of a large market share held by one main undertaking in relation to 
55 Hoffman-La Roche, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R at 283-84. Please note that in the original 
text of all of the cases discussed in this section, the courts were referring to Article 86, the 
fonner number for what is now Article 82. 
56 ld. at 274-75. 
57 Case 322/81, Nederlandsche Banden-IndustIie Michelin N.V. Y. Commission, 1983 
E.C.R 3461, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R 282, 327 (1983) [hereinafter Michelin]. 
58 See id. at 320-23. See also Hoffman-La Roche, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R at 277; Ahmed, 
[1990] 4 C.M.L.R at 135. 
59 See id. 
60 See Michelin, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R at 322. 
61 See id. at 320-23. See also Hoffman-La Roche, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R at 277; Ahmed, 
[1990] 4 C.M.L.R at 135. 
62 See Hoffman-La Roche, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R at 277; Michelin, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R at 
323. 
80 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 23:71 
its competitors.63 In Hoffman-La Roche, where the EC] considered the 
issue of whether a vitamin manufacturer had a dominant position in 
seven relevant vitamin markets, the Eel stated that "although the im-
portance of market shares may vary from one market to another, the 
view may legitimately be taken that very large shares are in them-
selves, and save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the exis-
tence of a dominant position."64 In United Brands, where the Eel con-
sidered whether a large, international banana import/export company 
(UBC) occupied a dominant position in a specific banana market, the 
EC] stated that an undertaking in the relevant market "can only be in 
a dominant position on the market for a product if [it] has succeeded 
in winning a large part of this market. "65 The EC] then illustrated the 
importance of an undertaking'S market share in relation to its next 
largest competitor in determining the existence of a dominant posi-
tion.66 Finally, in Michelin, where the Eel considered whether Mich-
63 See Hoffman-La Roche, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R at 275. See, e.g. Case C-62/86, AKZO 
Chemie BV v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R 3359, [1993] 5 C.M.L.R 215, 279 (1991) [herein-
after AKZO]; Michelin, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R at 326; United Brands, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R at 
489-90. 
64 Hoffman-La Roche, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R at 275. The court continued this general 
statement with the following illustration using the facts of the case: 
Id. 
An undertaking which has a very large market share and holds it for some 
time, by means of the volume of production and the scale of the supply which 
it stands for-without those having much smaller market shares being able to 
meet rapidly the demand from those who would like to break away from the 
undertaking which has the largest market shal'e-is by virtue of that shal'e in 
a position of strength which makes it an unavoidable trading partner and 
which already because of this secures for it, at the very least during relatively 
long periods, that freedom of action which is the special feature of a domi-
nant position. 
65 United Brands, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R at 489. 
66 See id. at 489-90. The court's illustration, using specific facts of the case, was as fol-
lows: 
[I]t can be considered to be an established fact that UBC's share of the rele-
vant market is always more than 40 per cent and nearly 45 per cent. This per-
centage does not however permit the conclusion that UBC automatically con-
trols the market. It must be determined having regard to the strength and 
number of the competitors. It is necessal'Y first of all to establish that on the 
whole of the relevant market the said percentage represents grosso mondo a 
share several times greater' than that of its competitor Castle and Cooke 
which is the best placed of all the competitors, the other coming far behind. 
This fact together with the others to which attention has already been drawn 
may be regarded as a factor which affords evidence of UBC's preponderant 
strength. 
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elin NV occupied a dominant position on the Dutch market for new, 
heary vehicle replacement tires, the ECJ stated that the Commission 
correctly considered Michelin NV's market share of 57 to 65% in 
comparison to the market share of its next largest competitor of 4 to 
8% in determining that it had a dominant position in the market for 
new, heary vehicle replacement tires.67 
The ECJ has already applied the two-factor test illustrated above 
to the airline industry.68 The first part of the test determining the 
relevant market and the interchangeability of products on the market 
in the airline industry involves a determination of whether a "sched-
uled flight on a particular route can be distinguished from the possi-
ble alternatives" because of its specific characteristics which make it 
"not interchangeable with those alternatives" and cause it only to be 
minimally affected by competition from them.69 Furthermore, within 
the context of the first part of the test, the determination of an air-
line's market power on a specific route will depend on both its "eco-
nomic strength" and on the "competitive position of other carriers 
operating on the same route or on a route capable of serving as a sub-
stitute. "70 
3. What Type of Conduct Will Be Deemed an Abuse of a Dominant 
Position? 
In analyzing whether a dominant undertaking has engaged in the 
abuse of its dominant position, the necessary determination is 
whether the dominant undertaking has used its position in a manner 
that allowed it to obtain competitive advantages or benefits that it 
could not have obtained through "normal and sufficiently effective 
competition."71 In general, abusive behavior may be found where a 
firm in a dominant position strengthens tllat position to an extent 
that "substantially obstructs" the competitive ability of competitor un-
dertakings in the relevant market. 72 Within this context, where an un-
Id. 
6i See Michelin, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R at 326. 
68 See Ahmed, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R at 135. 
69Id. 
iO Id. 
il United Brands, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R at 502; see also ARZO, [1993] 5 C.M.L.R at 281 
("Article [82] prohibits a dominant undertaking from eliminating a competitor and 
thereby strengthening its position b,' using methods other than those which come within 
the scope of competition on the basis of quality. -). 
i2 Continental Can, [1973] Part 68 C.I\I.L.R at 225. 
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dertaking occupies a dominant position, and where that dominant 
position has already weakened the competitive structure of the rele-
vant market, any additional weakening of the competitive structure 
on that market may constitute an abuse of a dominant position.73 
Specific abuses that are illustrated in ECJ case law include: tying pur-
chasers to an exclusive distributor,74 predatory pricing,75 discrimina-
tory prices,76 restrictive contract clauses enforced by a dominant 
competitor,77 and conditional discounts.78 
II. THE BA/ AA ALLIANCE, THE COMPETITION ISSUES RAISED BY THE 
ALLIANCE, AND THE COMMISSION'S RECENT REACTION TO THOSE 
ISSUES 
A. Background on Framework of BA/ AA Alliance and General Competition 
Issues Raised 
OnJune 11, 1996, BA and AA concluded an agreement to estab-
lish a worldwide airline alliance.79 This alliance would combine two of 
the world's most powerful airlines.8o The alliance involves a coordina-
tion of BA and AA's passenger and cargo services between the U.S. 
73 See Hoffman-La Roche, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R at 299. 
74 See id. at 289 ("undertaking which is in a dominant position on a market and ties 
purchasers--even if it does so at their request-by an obligation Ol' promise on their part 
to obtain all or most of their requirements exclusively from the said undertakings abuses 
its dominant position within the meaning of Article [82] "). 
75 See AKZO, [1993] 5 C.M.L.R at 281 ("[P]lices below average total costs, that is to 
say, fixed costs plus valiable costs, but above average valiable costs, must be regarded as 
abusive if they are determined as part of a plan fOl' eliminating a competitor. Such plices 
can dlive from the market undertakings which are perhaps as efficient as the dominant 
undertaking but which, because of their smaller financial resources, are incapable of with-
standing the competition waged against them."). 
76 See United Brands, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R at 500-01 ("policy of diffeling plices [depend-
ing on the circumstances of the Member State] enabling UBC to apply dissimilar condi-
tions to equivalent U'ansactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a com-
petitive disadvantage, was an abuse of a dominant position"). 
77 See id. at 491-94 (conU'act resuiction by large banana producer (UBC) with 45% 
market share which imposed on lipener/distributors obligation not to resell bananas not 
fully lipened and resuicting sales by lipener/ distlibutor only to retailers found to be abuse 
of dominant position). 
78 See Michelin, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R at 330-31 ("loyalty rebate, which by offeling cus-
tomers financial ad\'antages tends to prevent them from obtaining their supplies from 
competing manufacturers, amounts to an abuse within the meaning of Article [82]"). 
79 See Commission Notice, supra note 11, at 10. 
80 See Michele McDonald, Pending Open Skies, American, BA Plan Majur Code-Sharing Alli-
ance; International Alliance Between American Airlines Inc. and British Airways PLC, TRAVEL 
''''KLy.,june 13, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, l\1AGS File. 
1999] The Dominant Position Doctl'ine 83 
and Europe, schedule meshing, the establishment of fully reciprocal 
frequent-flier programs, and code-shares across each other's global 
networks.81 The code-shares enable flights of each airline to carry the 
designator codes of both carriers regardless of who is operating the 
flight.82 The code-shating combined with the schedule meshing is de-
signed to provide consumers with a type of one-stop shopping be-
tween both airlines.83 
This coordination would include BA's 244 flights a week from the 
U.K to 22 gateways in the U.S., and AA's 238 flights a week from 7 
U.S. gateways to 12 European destinations.84 Under the planned alli-
ance, BA and AA would remain independent and no exchange of eq-
uity or cross-ownership is planned.85 However, BA and AA do expect 
to share profits from their transatlantic services.86 Within this context, 
the BAI AA alliance, like other international airline alliances, can be 
viewed as very similar to a merger in that the companies involved op-
erate on the market like one entity, eliminating all competition be-
tween them.87 In fact, the extensive form of code-sharing in the 
BAI AA alliance where seats and revenues are pooled can be viewed as 
"a merger in all but name," as computer terminals are blind as to 
which airline's flight a passenger chooses.88 Thus, as the BAI AA alli-
ance effectively eliminates competition between two large interna-
tional airlines and essentially has the effect of a merger, it has raised 
competition concerns that the Commission feels must be addressed.89 
That is, where airlines decide to act as one entity, in ptinciple they 
create bartiers to entry that may preclude competitors from enteting 
markets served by an alliance.9o 
B. Primary Competition Issue-Tremendous Market Power of the BAI AA 
Alliance 
Perhaps the reason that the BAI AA alliance draws the most at-
tention of all the international airline alliances is the seemingly over-
81 See Carole A Shifrin, Tmnsatlantic Pact Hostage to Heathrow Access, Ay. WK. & SPACE 
TECH.,June 17, 1996, availablR in LEXIS, News Library, l\1AGS File. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. 
86 See Shifrin, supm note 81. 
87 See lim Miert Speech, supm note 1. 
88 Come Fly With Me, supm note 3. 
89 See Hm Miert Speech, supm note 1. 
90 See id. 
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whelming market power the alliance affords the combined airlines.91 
At the time of the proposed alliance in 1996, BA already provided 
39% of the seats available in London's Heathrow Airport market.92 
Overall, the alliance would giye the two airlines more than 60% of the 
overall traffic between the U.S. and the U.K93 and control over as 
much as 64% of the total seats between Heathrow and the U.S.94 With 
respect to the highly lucrative Heathrow-New YorkJFK Airport route, 
the alliance would give the combined airlines a 70% share of that 
market.95 According to BA/ AA officials, the combined slot holdings of 
BA/ AA at Heathrow will equal about 40% of available slots.96 Overall, 
the alliance is said to give the two airlines 25% of the entire North 
Atlantic market.97 
Perhaps most important for a determination of whether the 
BA/ AA alliance creates a dominant position are the figures showing a 
comparison of the overall size of the BA/ AA alliance in terms of mar-
ket share in 1996 as compared to the other large international alli-
ances at that time.98 The BA/ AA alliance was reported to be 50% 
larger than the Delta alliance, four times larger than the North-
west/KLM alliance, and more than twice as large as the 
United/Lufthansa alliance.99 Such overwhelming market power in 
comparison to its competitors certainly allows for the presumption 
that the BA/ AA alliance would be in a dominant position on the 
transatlantic market, in particular the U.S./U.K market. IOO Moreover, 
the alliance gives BA the ability to extend its network in the U.S. and 
gives AA the benefit of feeder services operated by BA.IOI Within that 
context, the alliance essentially gives each airline the ability to accom-
plish something it could not accomplish without the other; this ability 
91 See Shifrin, supra note 81; Come Fly With Me, supra note 3; McDonald, supra note 80; 
Courting, ECONOMIST, July 13, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, MAGS File; Four 
Trans-Atlantic Alliances Hold 57% of North Atlantic: Study, WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, July 29, 
1996, available in 1996 WL 8067642. 
92 See McDonald, supra note 80. 
9S See Shifrin, supra note 81; Courting, supra note 91. 
94 See Come Fly With Me, supra note 3. 
95 See Shifrin, supra note 81. 
96 See McDonald, supra note 80. 
97 See Four Trans-Atlantic Alliances Hold 57% of North Atlantic: Study, supra note 91. 
98 See Shifrin, supra note 81. 
99 See id. 
100 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying texts. 
101 See ~an Mil!lt Speech, sUfn'tl note 1. 
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may distort normal competition, and therefore, the alliance can be 
viewed as constituting an abuse of a dominant position.102 
C. CO'mmissiO'n's RespO'nse to' the Competition Issues Raised Uy the BA/ AA 
Alliance 
In light of the obvious competition issues raised by the BA/ AA 
alliance, the Commission quickly decided to initiate proceedings un-
der Article 85 of the EC Treaty to investigate the alliance to the extent 
that it related to air transport services between the U.S. and 
Europe.I03 On July 8, 1998, after a two-year investigation, the Commis-
sion issued its preliminary opinion on the BA/ AA alliance.104 The 
Commission found that the current proposed agreement for estab-
lishing the BA/AA alliance "in its entirety infringes on Article [81]," 
and also may violate Article 82 with respect to certain hub-to-hub 
routes "if implemented without the measures envisaged by the Com-
mission. "105 The Commission was particularly concerned that the 
BA/ AA alliance would reinforce BA/ AA's dominant position on three 
specific hub-to-hub routes-London-Dallas, London-Miami, and Lon-
don-Chicago; as such, it felt that the alliance would raise significant 
barriers to entry on those routes. I06 
As a result of its concerns over the impact of the alliance on 
competition, the Commission proposed several conditions necessary 
for its approval of the alliance.I07 The primary conditions with respect 
to the alliance's potential damaging effects on competition focus on a 
reduction of the frequency of flights on mcyor routes and a surrender 
of a certain number of slots. IOS Specifically, the number of flights of 
the combined carriers on hub-to-hub routes must be reduced where: 
1) total annual traffic is greater than or equal to 120,000 passengers; 
102 See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying texts. 
10~ See Commission Notice, supra note 11, at 10; Airline Alliances, supra note 10, at 2. 
104 See id. After a brief period for comments, the Commission will issue its final deci-
sion, after which it is up to national authorities to make decisions in line with the Commis-
sion. See EU Decision Near on AA/BA.; EUl'Opean Union, Alliance of AIM/ican Airlines and British 
Airways; Brief Article, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, July 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
MAGS File. 
105 Commission Notice, supra note 11, at 10. In the original text, the Commission's ac-
tual references were to Article 85 (now Article 81) and Article 86 (now Article 82). 
106 See id. at 10-11; Airline Alliances, supra note 10, at 2. 
107 See Airline Alliances, supra note 10, at 2-3. For purposes of this discussion, the brief 
summary of the conditions pm\ided in EU Focus will be used. The entire comprehensh'e 
conditions are laid out in the published opinion. See Commission Notice, supra note 11. 
lOS See Airline Alliances, supra note 10, at 2. 
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and 2) BAI AA currently operates more than 12 flights per week,l°9 
Further, BAI AA will be required to reduce its combined number of 
weekly flights if requested to do so by a competitor airline within six 
months after the Commission's authorization of the alliance.110 
Moreover, the total number of slots required to be released without 
compensation is 267 and, where necessary, BAI AA will be required to 
give up any airport facilities necessary for the use of relinquished 
slots.lll The EU's Competition Minister in 1998, Karel Van Miert, re-
portedly stated that any London Heathrow slots given up must be for 
transatlantic service and at desirable times. ll2 Further, where a com-
petitor airline wants to launch or expand an existing service and is 
unable to obtain the necessary slots in accordance with the procedure 
delineated in the EC slot regulations, BAI AA will be required to make 
available the necessary slots in London.113 
III. ANALYSIS OF EU ISSUES RAISED BY BAI AA ALLIANCE AND 
CRITIQUE OF COMMISSION OPINION AND EU COMPETITION POLICY 
A. Analysis of Competition Issues Raised by Large International Airline 
Alliances Such as BAI AA 
In the airline industry the evidence is not conclusive that "bigger 
is better."114 Size may in fact merely bring with it the ability to "crush 
smaller airlines and jack up prices. "115 These statements are not so far-
fetched when one considers what a large alliance such as BAI AA 
really means; it means that two large airlines that once competed with 
one another would instead cooperate to achieve the same goal-an 
increase in both of their revenues.116 While airlines claim that alli-
ances sometimes intensify competition, considering that the main 
109 See id. 
110 See id. 
111 See id. at 3. 
112 See EU Decision Near on AAIBA; European Union, Alliance of American Airlines and Brit-
ish Airways; Brief Article, supra note 104. 
113 See Airline Alliances, supra note 10, at 3. 
114 Alan R. Bender, Allied Airlines: The New Robber Barons?, Av. WK. & SPACE ThCH., June 
22, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8144396. With respect to the authority of these statements, it 
should be noted that Alan R. Bender is an associate professor of aeronautical science at 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, and he has been a student of U.S. airlines for more 
than 20 years. See id. 
115 Id. 
116 See generally Shiflln, supra note 10; ltm Miert Speech, supra note 1; Come Fly With Me, 
supra note 3. 
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point of an alliance is a joint approach to the market, damaging price 
competition would not make much sense.1l7 In fact, airline alliances 
result in fewer remaining competitors with less overlap and thus less 
inclination to compete on prices.118 In contrast, multiple carriers, 
each with different strengths and weaknesses and a variety of struc-
tures, would likely lead to instability and in turn produce fare compe-
tition.119 As a result of the large airline alliances, competition has al-
ready diminished on some routes to gateway European. cities 
dominated by alliances.120 AA eliminated its Miami-Frankfurt flights in 
the face of the United/Lufthansa alliance, leaving only a single daily 
flight operated by Lufthansa with a United code-share.121 AA also 
pulled out of its New York-Zurich route in the face of the 
Delta/Swissair alliance.122 As a result, according to a Scandinavian 
company, Volvo Aero, business-class tickets on the Miami-Frankfurt 
and New York-Zurich routes have risen by 18% compared with an in-
ternational average of 13%.123 
Such general factors and evidence do not bode well for airlines 
that would have to compete with an alliance as powerful in the market 
for traffic between the U.S. and the U.K as the BA/ AA alliance would 
prove to be.124 The BA/ AA alliance would have control of: 60% of 
overall traffic between the U.S. and the U.K;125 64% of seats between 
London's Heathrow Airport and the U.S.;126 and control of 70% of 
the highly lucrative Heathrow-New YorkJFK Airport route.127 Thus, it 
is not surprising that the proposed BA/ AA alliance has been criticized 
by both British and American competitor airlines in the transatlantic 
market.128 The chairman of Virgin Atlantic Airways said that an ap-
proval of the BA/ AA alliance with complete immunity from competi-
tion laws would amount to the establishment of a "legalized cartel. "129 
Similarly, the president and CEO of Continental Airlines was 
quoted as stating that, "[t]he two largest transatlantic carriers should 
117 See Come Fly With Me, supm note 3. 
n8 See Shifrin, supm note 10. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. 
m See Shifrin, supra note 10. 
124 See Shifrin, supra note 81; Come Fly With Me, supm note 3; Courting, supra note 91. 
125 See Shifrin, supra note 81; Cow·ting, supra note 91. 
126 See Come Fly with Me, supra note 3. 
127 See Shifrin, supra note 81. 
128 See id. 
129 ld. 
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not be allowed to combine their operations without requiring a sub-
stantial divestiture of assets to assure genuine competition. "130 While 
the chairman and CEO of AA contends that the BAI AA alliance's 
shares in key markets will be much lower than shares in other markets 
held by similar airline alliances, the "other markets" may not be com-
parable.131 The airlines where other alliances have large shares involve 
smaller European countries with a limited level of service, whereas the 
market where BAI AA would have a tremendous markt:t share-the 
New York-London route-would be the largest international city-pair 
with restricted entry.132 
B. Critique of Commission opinion and EU Competition Policy 
In light of the potential effect on competition on the transatlan-
tic market posed by the BAI AA alliance, the Commission could not 
allow the BAI AA alliance to go through without issuing its opinion on 
necessary conditions for approval of the alliance.133 Questions remain 
within the industry. however, as to whether the Commission's opinion 
goes far enough.134 Virgin Atlantic's Chairman is quoted as saying that 
the Commission's recommendations "don't go nearly far enough" 
and that the number of slots to be given up is ''woefully inade-
quate. "135 A Delta senior vice president felt that the BAI AA alliance 
would still have the ability to "dwarf their competition" at Heathrow 
airport.136 Nevertheless, there is general agreement that the surrender 
of slots by the BAI AA alliance is necessary137 and that is in fact one of 
130 Id. 
13l Id. 
132 See Shifrin, supra note B1. 
133 See generally Commission Notice, supra note 11; Airline Alliances, supra note 10, at 2. 
Although beyond the scope of this Note, an interesting side note in this context is the 
more recent response to the BAI AA alliance from U.S. competition authorities. It is thus 
worth noting here that on July 30, 1999, the U.S. government rejected an application for 
antitrust immunity from American Airlines and British Airways. See US. Guvt Rejects Anti-
trust Immunity f(ff BAlAA, AIRLINE INDUSTRY INFO., Aug. 3, 1999, available in LEXIS, News 
Library, MAGS File. 
134 See Shifrin & Sparaco, supra note B. 
135Id. 
136 Id. 
137 See generally Shifrin & Sparaco, supra note B; Van Miert Speech, supra note 1. When 
the British House of Commons Transport Select Committee decided against referring the 
BAI AA alliance to the Monopolies & Mergers Commission, all members of the House of 
Commons Transport Select Committee agreed that the BAI AA alliance should surrender 
slots at London airports. See James Ott, USAir Cries"Fulll at BA-American Pact, Av. WK. & 
SPACE 'fECH., Aug. 5, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, MAGS File. 
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the primary focuses of the Commission's opinion.138 Moreover, the 
competitor airlines complaining that the number of slots BA/ AA 
must give up is inadequate seem to overlook the fact that the pro-
posed conditions allow for the relinquishment of additional slots in 
London if a competitor airline wants to launch or expand an existing 
service and is unable to obtain the necessary slots in accordance with 
EC slot regulations.139 Accordingly, at the present time, the Commis-
sion's proposed restrictions are an adequate means of attempting to 
control the BA/ AA alliance without destroying the alliance altogether. 
Ultimately, given both the reaction from those within the airline 
industry and the tremendous competitive issues raised by the BA/ AA 
alliance, the Commission's present opinion may be most appropri-
ately viewed as a step in the right direction in terms of the Commis-
SiOlI'S role of enforcing Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. Issuance 
of the opinion allows the Commission to assert itself as the primary 
competition authority in the EU and to serve notice that it will take 
steps to enforce Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty in situations 
where the Commission and many industry insiders feel that a large 
alliance would harm competition and thus violate these Articles. 
While competitor airlines may feel the Commission's opinion does 
not go far enough, the fact is that the BA/ AA alliance has been forced 
to give up an apparently large number of slots-267-with provisions 
allowing for the relinquishment of additional slots. These measures 
directly address competitor airlines' concerns that they would be un-
able to obtain slots with which to compete against the BA/ AA alli-
ance. The opinion is, after all, only preliminary, and interested parties 
were provided 30 days to respond with comments.140 In the end, there 
is no way to know whether the regulations proposed in the Commis-
sion's opinion go far enough until they have been in operation for a 
few years. 
Of furtller general interest in this discussion, however, is the fact 
that in investigating the BA/AA alliance, the Commission's powers 
were limited to investigation through Article 85 of the EC Treaty, al-
lowing the Commission only to introduce monitoring provisions 
rather than specific implementing regulations.141 The reason for this 
limitation is that Regulation 3975/87 currently applies only to intra-
138 See Commission Notice, supra note 11, at 11-12; Airline Alliances, supra note 10, at 2-
3. 
139 See id. 
140 SeeCommissioll Notice, supra note 11, at 16; AMine Alliances, supra ilote 10, at 2. 
141 See EC TREATY, supra note 25, art. 85; Report on Competition Policy, supra note 48. 
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Community flights. 142 This situation does not allow the Commission to 
respond to international airline alliances with the necessary effective-
ness.143 In order to be able to adequately deal with the emerging 
trend toward international airline alliances, the scope of current EU 
competition policy-specifically, Regulation 3975/87-must be ex-
panded to allow the Commission to have the power to apply Articles 
81 and 82 of the EC Treaty to air transport routes between the EU 
and non-Member States. l44 An expansion of Regulation 3975/87 
would provide the Commission with the appropriate legal tools for 
applying EU competition policy both within the EU and in relations 
with non-Member States by allowing direct application of Articles 81 
and 82 of the EC Treaty to flights between member and non-Member 
States. 145 
CONCLUSION 
The EU's current competition law-specifically, the dominant 
position doctrine-provides an initial framework for dealing with 
large international airline alliances such as the BA/ AA alliance. The 
tremendous market power that this alliance will have on certain key 
transadantic markets, and evidence of the detrimental effects of simi-
lar alliances in operation, demonstrate that the BA/ AA alliance 
should be subject to scrutiny under the dominant position doctrine. 
Therefore, the Commission's preliminary opinion proposing condi-
tions necessary for the approval of the BA/ AA alliance is an adequate 
response to the alliance. While it may not currendy please all industry 
insiders, the realization that the Commission must take a position on 
such alliances is a step in the right direction. The Commission's cur-
rent EU competition policy, however, does not go far enough to allow 
the Commission to adequately apply the dominant position doctrine 
to international airline alliances. The Commission's powers in this 
area must be extended to allow it the same power to enforce the 
dominant position doctrine to flights between EU Member States and 
non-Member States that it currendy has with respect to flights be-
tween Member States. 
142 See Report on Competition Policy, supra note 48. 
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
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